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CHALLENGING SUPREMACY: VIRGINIA'S RESPONSE
TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT
Matthew R. Farley *
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care reform has been a primary goal of presidential
candidates for the past half-century. At least since the adoption of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948' and the in-
ception of the Medicare system in 1965,2 the primacy of achieving
extensive and efficient health care in American policymaking
cannot be seriously disputed.- Currently, health care costs seem
uncontrollable, and nearly fifty million Americans remain unin-
sured.4 Continuing into modern times, a cornerstone of President
Bill Clinton's first term in office was to provide health care for all
Americans.5 And although Democrats held a majority of seats in
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Thomas E. Johnston, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of West Virginia. J.D., 2010, University of Richmond School of Law;
B.A., 2007, University of Mary Washington.
1. G.A. Res. 217 (1II) A, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available
at http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/2007/hrphotos/declaration%20-eng.pdf (estab-
lishing a fundamental human right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-
being).
2. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
3. More strikingly, efforts to realize universal health care coverage in the United
States can be traced as far back as 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt campaigned on a plat-
form of health insurance for industry workers. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE-A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS IN THE U.S. 1 (2009) [herei-
nafter HISTORY OF REFORM], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf
("[A]s early as 1915, Progressive reformers ineffectively campaigned in eight states for a
state-based system of compulsory health insurance.").
4. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 20, 22 (U.S. Census Bureau
2009), available at http:/Iwww.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf.
5. See generally Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993) ("A bill
[t]o ensure individual and family security through health care coverage for all Americans.
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both chambers of Congress at the time, Clinton's attempt to re-
vamp the health care system failed remarkably.6
Comprehensive health care reform in the United States was
not seriously considered again until Barack Obama's election in
2008. President Obama vowed to focus on comprehensive health
care reform during his first year in office.7 Despite having both
chambers of Congress on their side once again," Democrats expe-
rienced significant legislative setbacks throughout 2009 and early
2010.1 Ultimately, however, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("PPACA") was signed into law on March 23, 2010,10 de-
feating sturdy opposition in both chambers."
Despite the success of the congressional reform effort, a debate
about health care rages on in America. The debate centers on
questions about who should have access to health care and on
what terms, about the quality of acceptable health care, and
about the cost and sustainability of health care.12 Many times the
debate is reduced to ideological extremes, asking, for instance,
whether there is a fundamental right to health care at all." Per-
haps the most divisive issue is the proper role of government-
."); see also HISTORY OF REFORM, supra note 3, at 7-8.
6. See Jonathan Oberlander, Learning From Failure in Health Care Reform, 357
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1677, 1677 (2007). The failure of the Clinton health care plan resulted
in landslide victories for Republicans in the 1994 midterm elections. This "Republican rev-
olution" gave the GOP control of both the House of Representatives and the United States
Senate for the first time since Eisenhower's tenure. See Andrea Stone, Republican Revolu-
tion Fades, USA TODAY, Jan. 20, 2003, at A4.
7. See Roger Simon, Editorial, The Legendary Rahm Emanuel, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June
28, 2009, at A29.
8. OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Congressional
Profile, http://clerk.house.gov/memberjinfo/cong.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (During
the 111th Congress, Democrats controlled the House of Representatives 255 to 178 and
the Senate 57 to 41.).
9. See, e.g., Janet Hook & Noam N. Levey, Health Care: Heat on Pelosi, Obama, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 8, 2010, at C11; Jeff Zeleny, A Failure to Communicate or the Wrong Message?,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A17.
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (amended 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
11. Janet Hook & Noam N. Levey, Health Care: Heat on Pelosi, Obama, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 8, 2010, at C11.
12. See generally Noam N. Levey & Tom Hamburger, Supporters to Tout Health Law,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 2010, at C15; Kevin Sack, Health Care Wastefulness Is Detailed in
Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at A15; Duff Wilson, Vein Study Gets a Rare Challenge,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010, at B1.
13. See, e.g., CAROLYN L. ENGELHARD & ARTHUR GARSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN HEALTH POLIcY (2008), available at http://www.
healthsystem.virginia.edulinternet/phs/news/does/mcbriefingfinal.pdf.
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particularly the federal government-in administering whatever
answers are reached on other issues of health care concern.1
This wide disparity of thinking about the federal government's
proper role became immediately apparent as both chambers of
Congress worked to pass health care reform legislation in the ele-
venth hour of 2009.15 Both the House billP6 and Senate bill" faced
rigorous debate and constitutional challenge from congressional
conservatives on the floors of their respective houses.'8 In addi-
tion, thirteen state attorneys general entered the fray, announc-
ing they would file a lawsuit if the then-proposed reform efforts
succeeded.'9 The state attorneys general objected specifically to
the so-called "Nebraska compromise" and similar provisions in
the Senate bill, as well as the funding mechanism, or "individual
mandate," contained in both bills.20 According to those state cri-
14. See 155 CONG. REC. H12591-94 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009); Ross Douthat, Op-Ed,
Let's Make a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at A21 ('The right seeks a functioning mar-
ketplace in health care, subsidized but not micromanaged by the government. However
many small steps the Democratic legislation takes in that direction, its biggest step goes
miles the other way-toward a world where consumers are required to buy a particular
kind of health insurance, insurers are required to sell it to them, and the cost of health
care gets held down, ultimately, by price controls and bureaucratic supervision.").
15. See Robert Pear, Senate Approves Health Care Bill in Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2009, at Al; Dana Bash et al., House Passes Health Care Reform Bill, CNN (Nov.
8, 2009, 5:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/07/health.care/ index.html.
16. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
17. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess.
2009).
18. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H12048 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2009) (statement of Rep. Ted
Poe); Press Release, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Hatch Speaks Out Again on Constitutionali-
ty of Health Care Reform Bill (Dec. 11, 2009), http:/Ihatch.senate.gov/publiclindex.cfm?
FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-id=8028d1d2-1b78-be3e-eOlf-efclc9ea21
28&Month=12&Year-2009.
19. Letter from Henry McMaster, Attorney General of S.C., et al. to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Se-
nate (Dec. 30, 2009), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/uploadedFiles/Press/
Health%20Care%20provision%20letter.pdf; see also Debbie Elliott, State Attorneys Gener-
al Question Health Care Bill, NPR (Dec. 25, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/sto
ry.php?storyld=121869650.
20. Letter from Henry McMaster to Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, supra note 19. The
Nebraska Compromise exempts Nebraska from paying its share of the cost of Medicaid.
Id. Instead, the federal government would permanently fund Medicaid expansions in the
Senate bill, which will cost an estimate $100 million over ten years. Meg Kinnard, GOP
Officials Demand Change in Health Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2010, at A6.
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tics, both features of the federal bills overstepped Congress's
power as a lawmaking body of limited authority.21
Virginia, led by its then-Attorney General Bill Mims, was
among the thirteen states threatening a legal challenge to federal
reform efforts. 22 At the outset of the 2010 Session, the Virginia
General Assembly was considering multiple state health care
bills which purported to nullify or detract from the federal pro-
posals.2 1 And once the new McDonnell administration took its
seat in the Commonwealth, the reactionary fight was renewed
with vigor.24 Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli became the most
pronounced dissident of reform in Virginia, challenging both the
substance and process of the federal legislation directly. 25 It be-
came increasingly clear that conflict was inevitable. This projec-
tion was realized when Attorney General Cuccinelli filed suit
against the federal government in the wake of the passage of the
PPACA. 26
Part II of this article summarizes essential provisions of the
PPACA and discusses aspects of its passage in greater detail.
Part III details the various measures that Virginia undertook in
response to the federal efforts, and evaluates the efficacy and in-
tent of those measures. Also in Part III, constitutional challenges
to the PPACA-many of which are raised in Attorney General
Cuccinelli's lawsuit on behalf of Virginia-are considered in
greater detail. Part IV reflects on some additional hurdles health
care may face in the future, and Part V concludes.
21. See, e.g., Letter from Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Tex., to Kay Bailey Hutchi-
son and John Cornyn, U.S. Senators (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://burgess.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/1-5-2010 -_AbbottLettertoHutchison andCornynon_ healthbill.pdf.
22. See Letter from Henry McMaster to Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, supra note 19;
see also 13 Attorneys General Threaten Suit over Health Care, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 30,
2009, available at http://www.roanoke.com/news/breaking/wbl231386.
23. See infra notes 106-46 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Peter Slevin & Rosalind S. Helderman, GOP Sate Leaders Say They'll
Fight Health-Care Legislation, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2010, at As.
25. See Jim Nolan, Cuccinelli Says Virginia Will Sue Over Health-Care Bill, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 2010, at Al.
26. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, No. 3:10CV188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Virginia Complaint], ECF
No. 1.
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IL THE FEDERAL HEALTH CARE BILL
A. Passage
The PPACA followed a legislative path riddled with difficulty.
In late summer 2009, public outcry at town hall meetings across
the country diminished initial reform momentum.27 The public
was deeply divided, and many avidly opposed the reform effort.28
Remarkably, in response, President Obama addressed a joint ses-
sion of Congress in September to regroup his supporters and
garner further support from the American public.29 Finally, on
November 7, 2009, the House of Representatives successfully
passed the Affordable Health Care for America Act ("House bill")
by a narrow 220 to 215 vote.o However, the Senate did not debate
or vote on the House bill; instead, it developed its own bill, which
contained many provisions parallel to the House version." By act-
ing in this way, the Senate made clear that further revisions and
negotiations with House lawmakers would be necessary. On
Christmas Eve 2009, the Senate passed its bill on a strict party-
line vote, 60 to 39.32
In the early months of 2010, President Obama's prospects for
health care reform were crippled more deeply than ever before.
Seemingly in direct response to the advancing health care reform
legislation, for the first time since 1972, voters in Massachusetts
elected a Republican-Scott Brown-to represent them in the
United States Senate.3 The Republican victory had resounding
effects: not only did the Massachusetts special election break the
27. Town Hall Meeting on Health Care Turns Ugly, CNN (Aug. 18, 2009, 10:53 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/07/health.care.scuffles/index.html.
28. Id.
29. Barack H. Obama, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on Health Care Reform, in 2009 DAILY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 693 (Sept. 9, 2009); see
also David S. Broder, Editorial, Obama's Easier Path, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, at A25.
30. See 155 CONG. REC. H12967-68 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (House roll call 887).
31. See John Fritze, In Senate, Health Bill Has Major Hurdles, USA TODAY, Nov. 9,
2009, at Al (quoting Senator Lindsey Graham's comment that "The House bill is dead on
arrival in the Senate."); Kristin Jensen & Laura Litvan, Two Chambers, Two Bills,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 2009, at A2 (comparing the provisions of the House and Senate bills).
32. See 155 CONG. REC. 813891 (daily ed. Dec. 24, 2009) (Senate roll call 396).
33. See James E. Campbell, Democrats Must Heed Message of Massachusetts Voters,
BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 31, 2010, at G2. Brown made a campaign promise to be the forty-
first vote against the Senate Bill. See ScoTT BROWN, Issues, BROWN FOR U.S. SENATE,
http://www.brownforussenate.com/issues (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
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Democrats' filibuster-proof Senate majority;34 it also evoked a pro-
found response from conservative leaders across the country.35
Health care proposals that were once barreling forward in Con-
gress were instantly thrust into a state of limbo.
Of course, despite many voices of dissent and numerous delays,
Congress ultimately passed comprehensive health care reform of
an unparalleled breadth in March 2010.36 Congressional Demo-
crats united and pursued the most viable option in the wake of
Scott Brown's election to the Senate: they ushered the Senate bill
through the House of Representatives, and then passed amend-
ments to it with a later bill using the reconciliation process. 37
Scott Brown's vote, which most likely would have secured a Re-
publican filibuster in the Senate,"3 was effectively circumvented."9
After overcoming a final difficulty posed by a handful of pro-life
House Democrats, 40 the health care reform package passed the
House 219 to 212,'41 and it was signed into law by president Ob-
ama two days later.42
34. See Jim Acosta et al., Brown Wins Massachusetts Senate Race, CNN (Jan. 19,
2010, 10:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/19/massachusetts.senatelindex.
html.
35. See, e.g., Matt Viser, It's All Scott Brown on Capitol Hill, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22,
2010, at B1 (providing comments of Senators John McCain and Mitch McConnell); Robert
F. McDonnell, Governor, Commonwealth of Va., Response to State of the Union Address
(Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://soturesponse.com/SOTUResponse/comments/state-of_
the union response full_text.
36. See 156 CONG. REc. S1821-S1822 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2010) (56 to 40 Senate vote).
37. See generally David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Rally to Obama's
Call for Health Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at Al.
38. See David S. Broder, Editorial, A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2010, at A21.
39. See Harold Meyerson, Editorial, Finally, Democrats Govern, WASH. POST, Mar. 24,
2010, at A17.
40. See Kathleen Parker, Editorial, Hiding Behind Hyde, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2010,
at A13 (detailing the concerns of pro-life Democrat Representatives and the resolution
struck by those Representatives and the President). The opposition of Representative Bart
Stupak and several other pro-life Democrats was assuaged by an Executive Order, which
ensured consistency with the Hyde Amendment and implemented restrictions on abortion
funding in the PPACA. See Exec. Order No. 13,535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599-600 (Mar. 29,
2010).
41. 156 CONG. REC. H2152-53 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (House roll call 165).
42. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (amended 2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also Carolyn Lochhead, Obama Signs Health
Care Reform into Law, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 2010, at Al.
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B. Provisions
The overarching goal of the PPACA is to expand access to af-
fordable health care for all American citizens and legal resi-
dents.4 The approach embodied in the legislation is complex, in-
cluding the creation of health benefit exchanges44 and cost-
sharing schemes," and changes to taxes and fees connected to
health care and health insurance services.46 Additionally, the im-
position of a mandate requiring all citizens and legal residents to
obtain acceptable health coverage is absolutely necessary to en-
sure every American can afford health insurance under the
PPACA. 47
1. Modification of Public Programs
The PPACA significantly expands Medicaid benefits. Under the
new health care law, all eligible individuals under the age of six-
ty-five with an income exceeding 133%, but not exceeding 200%,
of the federal poverty level will be guaranteed health coverage
that meets or exceeds that which is available through the health
exchanges.4* This expansion means that an estimated sixteen mil-
lion additional low-income individuals will qualify for Medicaid.49
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., IN Focus: HEALTH DISPARITIES AND
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, http://www.healthcare.gov/1aw/infocus/disparities/index.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (stating that the PPACA will rein in insurance abuses, cap
premiums and prohibit denial of coverage, and make health insurance affordable for mid-
dle class Americans, among other things).
44. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311-1313, 124 Stat. 119, 173-85 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031-33).
45. Id. §§ 1401-1421, 124 Stat. at 213-42 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
46. Id. tit. IX, 124 Stat. at 847-83 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 and 42 U.S.C.).
47. See Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate-An Affordable
and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 6, 7 (2009)
("[R]esearch leaves no doubt that without an individual mandate, many people will remain
uninsured.") (citations omitted).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18051 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-203
and P.L. 111-240)). These figures are currently $29,327 and $44,100, respectively, per year
for a family of four. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199,
4200 (Jan. 23, 2009) (poverty guideline for family of four through Apr. 17, 2010 is $22,050;
multiplied by 1.33 equals $29,327 annual income; multiplied by 2.00 equals $44,100).
49. See U.S. CONG., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RECONCILIATION PROPOSAL AMENDMENT
9, tbl.4 (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xxldoc11379/Amend
ReconProp.pdf. (According to the Congressional Budget Office, the PPACA will reduce the
number of uninsured, nonelderly individuals by about thirty-two million, roughly sixteen
2010] 43
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In addition, the PPACA requires states to expand Medicaid to en-
compass adults who are not pregnant starting in 2014.50 In order
to finance health coverage for the newly eligible individuals, the
PPACA provides 100% federal funding for Medicaid from the ef-
fective date in 2014 through 2016, a figure that is gradually re-
duced to no more than 95% beginning in 2017.5'
However, the PPACA received a fair amount of criticism for
partially financing its increased Medicaid eligibility with over
$120 billion in cuts to Medicare Part C (Medicare Advantage)52
over the next decade.53 While not applicable to basic Medicare,
these reductions will reach over ten million seniors enrolled in
Medicare Advantage, or roughly twenty-five percent of the senior
population.54 Critically, these PPACA cuts may pressure private
health insurers administering the plans to eliminate supplemen-
tal coverage-such as vision and dental insurance-for those
enrolled.66
An additional alteration to Medicare coverage received less
criticism. The PPACA laid plans to eliminate a failing in prescrip-
tion drug coverage known as the "doughnut hole," which alludes
to the wide disparity in the initial coverage limit and the cata-
million of which will be new enrollees in Medicaid caused by this benefit expansion.)
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(10) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)).
51. Id. § 1396d.
52. Medicare Advantage is the option to receive Medicare benefits through private
health insurance plans, which frequently offer lower copayments or supplemental benefits.
See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (PART C), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-
basics/medicare-benefits/part-c.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
53. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-23(j) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding
P.L. 111-203 and P.L. 111-240)); see also Press Release, Senator John McCain, Statement
by Senator John McCain on the First Republican Amendment to the Health Care Bill
(Nov. 30, 2009), http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.Press
Releases&ContentRecordid=47538b18-beb4-65f7-e213-6b8bde316f71&Regionid=&Issue
id= ("[R]eductions include $120 billion to the Medicare Advantage program, $150 billion
to providers including hospitals, hospice, and nursing homes, and $23 billion in unspeci-
fied decreases . . . .").
54. Phil Galewitz, Health Insurance Q&A, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at El. See
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TOTAL MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (MA) ENROLLMENT, 2010, STATE-
HEALTHFACTS, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=327&cat=6 (last vi-
sited Oct. 30, 2010) (listing total MA enrollment at 10,259,669); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
UNITED STATES, AMERICAN FACTFINDER, http://www.census.gov/ (follow "American Fact-
finder: hyperlink; then follow "Fact Sheet" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
55. See Christy Tinnes & Brigen Winters, Does the PPACA Apply to Dental and Vision
Plans?, PLANSPONSOR (May 25, 2010), http://www.plansponsor.com/Does thePPACAAp
ply-toDental andVisionPlans.aspx.
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strophic threshold under Medicare Part D.56 Specifically, the
PPACA provides an immediate $250 rebate to beneficiaries cur-
rently in the doughnut hole and completely phases the doughnut
hole out by 2020, gradually decreasing the share of cost borne by
beneficiaries in the doughnut hole from 100% to 25%.67 This bene-
fit will reach nearly four million seniors who are currently paying
out-of-pocket for a large portion of their prescription costs due to
the Medicare Part D doughnut hole.68 The health care reform ef-
fort, however, did not address the approaching insolvency of the
Medicare program-due to run dry in 2017-as a whole.5
2. Health Insurance Exchanges and Individual Subsidies
In order to keep health insurance costs low, the PPACA re-
quires states to create insurance exchanges under the control of
federal guidelines.6o These "American Health Benefit Exchanges"
56. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3315, 124 Stat. 119, 479-80 (2010) (amended 2010)
(to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)). In other words, the Medicare be-
neficiary is financially responsible for all prescription drug costs exceeding the initial cov-
erage limit ($2,830 in 2010) until he has paid a minimum amount out-of-pocket ($4,550 in
2010), at which point Part D resumes coverage at a ninety-five percent rate. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 423.104 (2009); Medicare Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,678, 19,816 (Apr. 15, 2010) (to be co-
dified at 42 C.F.R. § 423.104); Fact Sheet Medicare Part D: An Overview, CAL. HEALTH
ADVOCATES, http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/ pdf/facts/D-001-CHAFactSheet.pdf; JACK
HOADLEY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART D SPOTLIGHT: PART D PLAN
AVAILABILITY IN 2010 AND KEY CHANGES SINCE 2006 1-2, 11 app. 2 (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7986.pdf.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)) (providing that the Secretary shall establish procedures for
retroactive reimbursement of Part D eligible individuals); see KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM: SUMMARY OF NEw HEALTH REFORM LAW 12, (2010), available
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.
58. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Sebelius Announces 1 Mil-
lion Medicare Beneficiaries Have Received Prescription Drug Cost Relief Under the Af-
fordable Care Act (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/08/20100830c.
html.
59. See John Garven, Presentation at the Meeting of the Central Ass'n of Health Un-
derwriters 15 (July 8, 2010), available at http:/fbenico.com/docs/ppaca-impact-on-medical-
tourism- 7_8_10.pdf. Curiously, however, a website hosted by the Department of Health
and Human Services ("DHHS") mentions the threat of insolvency as a primary motivation
for reforming the Medicare system. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
AMERICA'S SENIORS AND HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM: PROTECTING COVERAGE AND
STRENGTHENING MEDICARE (2009), http://www.healthreform.gov/reports/seniors/seniorsre
port.pdf (stating that "the threat of Medicare insolvency .... undermine[s] the health care
that the program's beneficiaries need and deserve. Health insurance reform will serve to
strengthen the health care that our seniors receive.").
60. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)).
2010] 45
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will make the purchase of health insurance easier for individuals
and small businesses with fewer than one hundred employees by
establishing clearinghouses for one-stop shopping.', Focusing
health insurance options in a centralized exchange not only pro-
vides individuals with more information and enhances portability
of coverage; 62 it also enables reformation of the insurance market
by managing the rules by which insurers are permitted to sell
coverage.63 The restrictions imposed on insurers by the PPACA
include: eliminating lifetime-and in certain cases annual-limits
on the dollar value of coverage, 4 prohibiting rescission of cover-
age except in cases of fraud,65 eliminating waiting periods for cov-
erage exceeding ninety days, 66 capping certain deductibles, 6 re-
quiring extension of dependent coverage to adult children up to
age twenty-six,68 and prohibiting preexisting exclusions" or rat-
ings for children.7 0 These restrictions on private insurers in the
Health Benefit Exchanges will be accompanied by the market en-
try of a nonprofit competitor, as required by law.7n And because
the law prohibits insurers from offering better rates to customers
outside the exchange for plans also offered within them,72 in many
cases, the restrictions discussed above control the outside market
61. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1304(b)(2), 1312, 124 Stat. 119, 171-81 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18024, 18032); David Balto, MAKING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION
WORK 4, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (June 2010), http://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2010/06/pdf/balto.memo.pdf.
62. See Healthcare Reform, GIBSON INSURANCE GROUP (2006), http://www.gibson
ins.com/healthcarereform.htm; Rick Curtis et al., Health Reform: What Legislators Need
To Know About Exchanges, National Conference of State Legislatures Webinar 13 (June
2, 2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/Exchangeswebinar
60210.pdf.
63. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§300gg, 300gg-3, -7, -11, -12, -14, 18022 (West, West-
law through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)).
65. Id. § 300gg-12.
66. Id. § 300gg-7.
67. Id. § 18022.
68. Id. § 300gg-14.
69. Id. § 300gg-3.
70. See id. § 300gg.
71. Id. § 18054. By critical account, the establishment of a nonprofit competitor in the
insurance market is tantamount to the establishment of a public option. See, e.g., ROBERT
MOFFIT & KATHRYN Nix, HERITAGE FOUND., THE PUBLIC HEALTH PLAN REINCARNATED:
NEW-AND TROUBLING-POWERS FOR OPM 1-6, available at http://www.heritage.org/Re
searchlReports/2010/01/The-Public-Health-Plan-Reincarnated-New-and-Troubling-Powers
-for-OPM.
72. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
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too. Notably, critics of the health care reform package condemn
this aspect of the plan for severely undercutting competition by
introducing federal standardization."
Of the twenty-five million individuals the Congressional Budg-
et Office estimates will purchase coverage in the exchanges,
about nineteen million are likely to be eligible for financial assis-
tance.74 Everyone making less than four times the federal poverty
level-$43,320 for an individual and $88,200 for a family of
four-will receive subsidies and credits under the new law, to be
determined on a sliding scale.75 This means that individuals mak-
ing more than 133% and less than 400% of the poverty level will
pay somewhere between 2% and 9.5% of their income for insur-
ance, and the government will cover the rest.76 Those working for
employers who offer health insurance will be eligible for these
subsidies too-the new law requires employers to provide a
voucher equal to the amount of money they contribute to their of-
fered policy if qualifying employees decide to shop in the ex-
changes instead.77 The Department of Health and Human Servic-
es ("DHHS") will oversee administration of the financial
assistance and will require verification of both income and citi-
zenship status.7 8
73. See Robert Moffit, A Federal Health Insurance Exchange Combined with a Public
Plan: The House and Senate Bills, BACKGROUNDER, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 1-4, available
at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf media/2009/pdflbg2304.pdf. This criticism is not against
health exchanges in general, but the specific conception embodied in the reform legisla-
tion, where government or non-profit administrators will be active participants in the
health insurance market, bargaining aggressively to reduce health care costs and impos-
ing regulatory cost controls. See id.
74. See Amy Goldstein, Insurance Subsidies Prompt Questions of Affordability, WASH.
POST, Mar. 20, 2010, at A4; U.S. CONG., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSAL
TO OFFER A PUBLIC PLAN THROUGH THE NEW HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 2 (July 22,
2010), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/1 16xxldocl 1689/StarkLetter-HR_- 5808-07-22.pdf.
75. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199, 4200 (Jan.
23, 2009) (poverty guideline for an individual is $10,830, multiplied by four equals
$43,320; poverty guideline for a family of four is $22,050, multiplied by four equals
$88,200); Goldstein, supra note 74. Those making less will get a bigger subsidy and those
nearer to the threshold a smaller one. See Goldstein, supra note 74.
76. See generally 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding
P.L. 111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
77. See id. § 4980H. An employee is eligible if his share of the premium exceeds 9.5%
and he makes less than 400% of the federal poverty guideline. Id. § 36B.
78. Id. § 18081; 42 U.S.C.A. § 18117 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding
P.L. 111-203 and P.L. 111-240)); see SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note
57, at 2.
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3. Tax Changes"
In order to finance the expanded Medicaid benefits and gener-
ous subsidies that the health care law provides, increased reve-
nues are necessary. As mentioned previously, the PPACA impos-
es an annual tax on individuals without qualifying coverage
totaling $695 per person (capped at $2085 per family) or 2.5% of
household income, whichever is greater. 0 It also increases the
Medicare Part A tax rate by 0.9% for individuals earning over
$200,000 and couples earning over $250,000, as well as imposes a
3.8% tax on unearned income on these higher-income taxpayers.'
Further, the PPACA phases in new excise taxes on high-premium
insurance plans (those which exceed $27,500 in annual cost), an
initiative that is estimated to generate $150 billion over ten
years. 2 Finally, health care reform imposes new annual fees on
both pharmaceutical manufacturers and private health insurers,
totaling $30.8 billion over ten years (2012 to 2021) for the former,
and $58.8 billion over five years (2014 to 2018) for the latter.,,
4. Changes to Private Insurance
The PPACA establishes an immediate temporary high-risk pool
to provide coverage for citizens and legal immigrants with pre-
existing medical conditions. 84 Enrollees in the high-risk pool will
receive subsidies comparable to cost-sharing currently in place for
health savings accounts. Additionally, the legislation imposes a
new process for reviewing increases in premiums, as well as a re-
79. There are more changes to the tax code than those summarized in this section,
including, for example, a new tax on tanning salons and multiple limitations and taxes on
health savings accounts. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 220 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255
(excluding P.L. 111-203 and P.L. 111-240)) (health savings accounts); id. § 5000B (tanning
services).
80. Id. § 5000A.
81. Id. § 1411, 3101; see also SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 57,
at 8.
82. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 49801 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)); U.S. CONG., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PATIENT PROTECTION &
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2, 16 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
107xx/doclO731/ Reidletter_11_18_09.pdf.
83. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)); id. § 4001 (private health insurers).
84. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18001 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)).
85. Compare id., with 26 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (health savings accounts).
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quirement that plans justify all unreasonable increases to state
exchanges. 86 And as mentioned previously, the law contains sev-
eral other changes to insurance market rules, many of them im-
posing market regulations and consumer protections.1
5. State Role
First and foremost, states are required to erect the exchanges
that the PPACA contemplates and oversee the new market regu-
lations and consumer protections."" The legislation also charges
states with ensuring the expedient enrollment of new Medicaid
beneficiaries and those eligible for subsidies in the exchanges."
The new law also makes grants available to states to establish
consumer assistance programs for the benefit of individuals with
private coverage.o
6. Improving Health Care Efficacy
A number of provisions seek to contain costs and improve the
performance of the health system. For instance, the PPACA
promises to simplify health insurance administration by requir-
ing uniform operating rules for an array of actions.", The PPACA
also grants the Food and Drug Administration broader authority
to approve generic prescription drugs.92 Other provisions include
offering states grants to develop alternatives to current tort liti-
gation,93 imposing harsher penalties for submitting false claims,94
and increasing funding for anti-fraud activities.99
86. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
87. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
88. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)).
89. Id. § 1396w-3; see also SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 57, at
7.
90. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18042 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-
203 and P.L. 111-240)).
91. See, e.g., id. § 300gg-95 (providing a "model uniform report form for private health
insurance issuer[s] seeking to refer suspected fraud").
92. See id. § 262; SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 57, at 9.
93. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g-15 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
94. See id. § 18033.
95. See id. § 1395i(k).
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7. Individual Mandate
The requirement that all individuals purchase qualifying
health coverage is perhaps the most well known and controversial
aspect of the PPACA. Indeed, as stated, the individual mandate is
the centerpiece of constitutional challenges to the PPACA, and it
is particularly difficult for many Americans to swallow on a per-
sonal level.96
In general, the individual mandate requires all U.S. citizens
and legal residents to maintain qualifying health care coverage. 7
Those individuals who refuse to obtain qualifying coverage will be
required to pay a penalty-$695 for each uninsured family mem-
ber (up to a maximum of $2085) or 2.5% of household adjusted
gross income per year, whichever is greater.9" The penalty will be
phased in starting in 2014, will reach full amount in 2016, and
will increase annually thereafter based on federal cost-of-living
adjustments.- Exemptions to the individual mandate include: fi-
nancial hardship, undocumented immigrants, religious objec-
tions, and those without coverage for less than three months."oo
The rationale for the individual mandate is simple: it is the on-
ly way to force young, healthy individuals-who often voluntarily
forego health insurance coverage-to pay into the system, thereby
cross-subsidizing the elderly and unhealthy.1o1 In other words, it
96. See, e.g., Roger Collier, The Pitfalls of PPACA #7-The Individual Mandate,
HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS (July 7, 2010), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/
pitfalls-ppaca-7-individual-mandate; Stephanie Condon, Obama Tells Students, Let's Go
Change the World, CBSNEWS, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503 544 162-
5317987-503544.html?tag-mncol;lst;1 ("The only way this plan works is if everybody ful-
fills their responsibility.") (statement of President Obama).
97. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
98. See id.; SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 57, at 1. Because it is
framed in terms of income, the individual mandate is a progressive penalty or tax. See Ro-
bert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A15.
99. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)); SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW, supra note 57, at 1.
100. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
101. See David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Jack Balkin, A Healthy Debate: The
Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 93, 94-95
(2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf. Furthermore, be-
cause enrollment cannot be denied for pre-existing conditions and premiums are heavily
restricted and equalized by the PPACA, it makes little sense for anyone to obtain health
insurance until they become sick. As such, financing aside, the mandate is necessary. Id.
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is the vehicle by which the PPACA achieves the comprehensive,
subsidized coverage laid out above. 0 2 Without the mandate, the
PPACA would be financially crippled, rendering the mandate ut-
terly inseverable from the rest of the law. 0 Interestingly, the in-
dividual mandate contains no enforcement mechanism at this
time.'04 The government can impose no criminal action or liens on
individuals who refuse to purchase qualifying insurance and fail
to pay the corresponding fine.05
III. VIRGINIA'S RESPONSE
'Are we going to be free men or are we going to be slaves to the
federal government of the United States?'0 6
During 2009 and 2010, forty state legislatures proposed legisla-
tion to limit, alter, or oppose aspects of health care reform legisla-
tion, mostly targeting the individual mandate and the establish-
ment of a single-payer "public option."'07 The push to amend state
constitutions and pass legislation in opposition to federal reform
efforts originated at the Goldwater Institute in Arizona, where a
constitutional amendment will be on the ballot this year.08 While
some of these measures failed or were abandoned in recent legis-
at 95.
102. Id. at 94-95. An alternative to the mandate is an income tax increase. Id.
103. See id. at 95 ("[W]ithout the mandate, the entire thrust of the Obama Administra-
tion's proposed regulatory scheme would produce utterly dysfunctional consequences.").
This is even truer now that DHHS has reported that the PPACA will not save money, but
cost over 250 billion dollars over the next ten years. See Memorandum from Richard S.
Foster, Chief Actuary, Office of the Actuary, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep't of
Health & Human Servs. 2, 4 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://burgess.house.gov/Upload
edFiles/4-22-2010_- OACTMemorandumonFinancialImpact-ofPPACAasEnacted.
pdf.
104. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
105. See id. § 5000A(g)(2).
106. Olympia Meola, Pro-Gun, States-Rights Rally Draws 1,000 to Capitol, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 2010, at A3, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2010/jan/181
legigatl8_20100118-121003-ar-17126/ (quoting Del. Charles W. Carrico, Sr., who, in turn,
is quoting Patrick Henry).
107. RICHARD CAUCHI, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEG., STATE LEG. CHALLENGING CERTAIN
HEALTH REFORMS, 2010 (last updated Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906
[hereinafter NCSL REPORT].
108. See Patrick Krey, State vs. Federal: The Nullification Movement, THE NEW
AMERICAN, Mar. 1, 2010, at 14; CLINT BOLICK, GOLDWATER INST., THE HEALTH CARE
FREEDOM ACT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, available at http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/
file/4372/download/4374 (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
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lative sessions,"o at least nine states passed opposition laws or
amendments in 2010,110 and another four passed nonbinding reso-
lutions in opposition to the federal health care initiative.'" A vi-
gorous debate about the efficacy of these opposition bills erupted
in early 2010, with the majority of commentators agreeing that
they are instruments of dissent with political, rather than legal,
force. 1
In addition to legislative action, several state attorneys general
promised legal challenges to the PPACA if it contained an indi-
vidual mandate or other controversial provisions. 13 These attor-
neys general made good on their word when Attorney General
Bill McCollum filed suit in the Northern District of Florida.1 14
Virginia is no exception to these trends among state govern-
ments. Even before its election, the current administration vowed
to oppose certain features of federal health care legislation in any
way possible."5 The Virginia General Assembly responded simi-
larly, introducing laws and amendments to the state constitution
that would directly conflict with federal legislation as it then
109. The measures failed in twenty-six states in 2010 and in an additional state in
2009. See NCSL REPORT, supra note 107. In 2010, the measures failed in Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Caroli-
na, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. In 2009, a North Dakota constitutional proposal failed. Id.
As of early August 2010, legislation opposing federal health care reform is pending in five
states: Delaware, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Id.
110. Id. (These nine states are Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia.) See id. The Arizona and Oklahoma legislation require a
statewide vote in 2010 to take effect. Id. In late July, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
that the constitutional amendment was inappropriate and removed it from the November
2010 ballot. Id.
111. See id. (These four states are Idaho, South Dakota, South Carolina, and Michi-
gan).
112. See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 869, 869 (2010). However, the reality of that consensus was thrust into jeo-
pardy when District Judge Henry Hudson agreed that the Commonwealth of Virginia had
standing to challenge the PPACA based, in part, on the tension between the federal legis-
lation and the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebe-
lius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603, 615 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010).
113. 13 Attorneys General Threaten Suit over Health Care, supra note 22.
114. See Complaint, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-91, 2010 WL
1038209 (N.D. Fla. filed Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Florida Complaint], ECF No. 1.
115. See, e.g., Letter from Twenty Republican Governors to Harry Reid, Senate Majori-
ty Leader, Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House,
and John Boehner, House Minority Leader (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.rga.org/homepage/
republican-governors-health-care-bills-omit-reform/ (a letter demonstrating then Gover-
nor-elect Bob McDonnell's opposition).
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stood.116 The Commonwealth's opposition to the PPACA reached
its zenith when Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli filed suit in the
Eastern District of Virginia to challenge the constitutionality of
the PPACA.117 These measures secured Virginia's place at the fo-
refront of the health care reform opposition movement.
A. Virginia Legislation
By popular accounts, a plurality of Virginians are opposed to
the PPACA.n' Beginning in early December 2009, members of
Congress filed a string of state bills and resolutions for the 2010
General Assembly Session, reflecting this dissatisfaction."' Of the
six measures introduced in either house, only one failed, although
the remaining five were condensed essentially into one law.120
1. Senate Bills 283, 311, and 417
Senate Bills 283, 311, and 417 were filed within days of each
other in early January 2010.121 Although identical, the bills were
sponsored by three different senators from across the Common-
wealth,122 perhaps as a maneuver to garner momentum for the
legislation. Strikingly, when introduced, almost one-quarter of
116. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 117-46 and accompa-
nying text.
117. See generally Virginia Complaint, supra note 26.
118. See, e.g., Jeff E. Schapiro, Nearly Half in Virginia Oppose Proposal, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2009, at Al (finding that 49% of Virginians oppose health care reform
proposals, "while 39 percent support it and 12 percent are undecided").
119. See generally What's Happening at the Capitol Today?, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Feb. 12, 2010, at A9.
120. See infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text. House Joint Resolution 7 was left
in the House Privileges and Elections Committee. See H.J. Res. 7, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2010), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?ses=101&typ=bil
&val=hj7.
121. See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010), available at http://legl.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb 2 83 (detailing the introduction of
SB283 on Jan. 12, 2010); S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010), available at
http://Iegl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb417 (detailing the in-
troduction of SB417 on January 13, 2010).
122. Senator Frederick M. Quayle from Suffolk sponsored Senate Bill 283. See S.
JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
legp504.exe?101+mbr+SB283. Senator Stephen H. Martin from Chesterfield sponsored
Senate Bill 311. See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?101+mbr+SB311. Senator Jill Holtzman Vogel
from Winchester, along with eight co-sponsors, sponsored Senate Bill 417. See S. JOURNAL,
Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.
exe?101+mbr+SB417.
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the Virginia Senate had signed on as patrons to the last of the
three bills, SB 417.123 As introduced, the bills read:
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or
is eligible for health insurance coverage under any policy or program
provided by or through his employer, or a plan sponsored by the
Commonwealth or the federal government, shall be required to ob-
tain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage. No provi-
sion of this title shall render a resident of this Commonwealth liable
for any penalty, assessment, fee, or fine as a result of his failure to
procure or obtain health insurance coverage.' 2 4
This language is a clear rejection of the individual mandate
contained in federal health care legislation, a provision that is
critical to financing federal reform efforts.
In less than two weeks, all three bills passed the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce and Labor, with minor amendment, by the
slimmest margins they would face.12 5 Despite the Senate Com-
merce and Labor Committee's ideological makeup-six Republi-
cans and nine Democrats-the senate bills passed eight votes to
seven, with Democrat Senators Colgan and Puckett joining the
six Republican committee members. 2 6 This bipartisan support for
the bills foreshadowed their passage by the full senate, a week
later, twenty-three votes to seventeen.' In short, the Virginia
123. See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010), available at http://leg1.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+mbr=SB417 (providing the nine patrons of SB417);
2010 SENATE OF VA., MEMBERSHIP MAILING LIST, http://sov.state.va.us/SOV%2OPortall
PDFs/Mailing/o20List-Landscape.pdf (last updated Sept. 21, 2010) (listing the forty mem-
bers of the Virginia Senate).
124. See, e.g., S.B. 417, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010), available at http://legl.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+ful+SB417.
125. See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://leg1.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+SO2V0018+SBO283; S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg.
Sess. _ (2010), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-binlegp504.exe?101+vote+SO2V00
12+SBO311; S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://legl.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+SO2V0017+SBO417 ('This section shall not apply
to individuals voluntarily applying for coverage under a state-administered program pur-
suant to Title XIX or Title XXI of the Social Security Act.").
126. See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://leg1.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+SO2V0017+SBO417 (detailing Jan. 25, 2010 vote on Se-
nate Bill 417 in Senate Commerce and Labor Committee); 2010 SENATE OF VA., supra note
123 (providing party affiliations).
127. See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010), available at http://leg1.state.
va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+SV0143SBO417+SBO417 (detailing Feb. 1, 2010 vote on
Senate Bill 417 by full Senate); 2010 SENATE OF VA., supra note 123 (designating party
affiliations).
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Senate, although Democrat controlled, flatly rejected the individ-
ual mandate on which federal legislation heavily relies for fund-
ing.128
Senate Bill 417 faced no substantial opposition in the House of
Delegates, passing sixty-six votes to twenty-nine. 12 9 Finally, to as-
suage concerns, Governor Bob McDonnell recommended language
to clarify that the bills did not prevent (1) courts from ordering
the provision of health insurance as a form of alimony or (2) uni-
versities from requiring health insurance for their students as a
condition of enrollment. 30 These recommendations were incorpo-
rated, passed both houses of the General Assembly, and the bills
were signed into law on March 10, 2010.131
2. House Bills 10 and 722
A month before the introduction of the senate bills, Manassas
Delegate Bob Marshall filed the Virginia Health Care Freedom
Act in the House of Delegates. 132 As introduced, the bill read:
No law shall restrict a person's natural right and power of contract
to secure the blessings of liberty to choose private health care sys-
tems or private plans. No law shall interfere with the right of a per-
son or entity to pay for lawful medical services to preserve life or
health, nor shall any law impose a penalty, tax, fee, or fine, of any
type, to decline or to contract for health care coverage or to partici-
pate in any particular health care system or plan, except as required
by a court where an individual or entity is a named party in a judi-
cial dispute. Nothing herein shall be construed to expand, limit or
128. S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. (2010).
129. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp54.exe?101+vot+HV0543+SBO417. Senate Bill 283
passed 67 to 29. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), availa-
ble at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+HV0541+SBO283. Senate Bill
311 passed 67 to 28. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates, of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010),
available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+HV0542+SBO311.
130. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://legl.
state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+amd+SB417AG (detailing Governor McDonnell's rec-
ommendations for SB417).
131. The Senate concurred, 25 to 15, in the Governor's recommendations and the bills
moved to his desk for signature. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010),
available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+SVO619SBO417+SBO417.
Governor McDonnell then signed the bills into law. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 10, 2010, ch. 108,
2010 Va. Acts (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
132. H.B. 10, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010) (enacted as Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch.
818, 2010 Va. Acts __J.
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otherwise modify any determination of law regarding what consti-
tutes lawful medical services within the Commonwealth. 3 3
While stated in terms of positive assertions of liberty and free-
dom,134 House Bill 10 plainly rejects the individual mandate as
overbroad. Shortly after its introduction, House Bill 722, which
more clearly opposes the individual mandate, was incorporated
into House Bill 10 by voice vote.13 ' The Virginia Health Care
Freedom Act easily cleared the House of Delegates in early Feb-
ruary 36 and moved into the Virginia Senate, where, after initial
hurdles,' 7 it was substantially revised.3 The final version of Del-
egate Marshall's bill was identical to Senate Bills 283, 311, and
417. 139
3. House Joint Resolution 7
A near mirror to his Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, Dele-
gate Bob Marshall also proposed an amendment to Article I of the
Virginia Constitution. 40 The amendment, which would have been
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See H.B. 722, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010); H. JOURNAL, House of Dele-
gates of Va., Reg. Sess. _ (2010), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?
ses=101&typ=bil&val=hb722 (detailing history of House Bill 722).
136. H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://
leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+vot+HV0526+HB0010.
137. House Bill 722 was mis-assigned to the Senate Committee on Education and
Health rather than the Committee on Commerce and Labor. See Stephen J. Rossie, Senate
Again Playing Games with Its Own Rules, This Time on HB 10!, FAMILYFOUNDATION
BLOG.cOM (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.familyfoundationblog.com/2010/02/12/Senate-again-
playing-games-with-its-own-rules-this-time-on-hb-10/. At least some critics suggested this
was an intentional act by Virginia Senate Democrats to delay the bills progression and
avoid another embarrassing defeat if possible. Id.
138. House Bill 10 incorporated House amendments but rejected Senate amendments
that would have removed much of the bill's bite. More specifically, Senator Peterson rec-
ommended adding the following: "This legislation is merely intended to inform the United
States Congress of the resolve of the General Assembly of Virginia in regard to proposed
Federal legislation. It is not intended to have any effect upon the existing laws of the
Commonwealth or any future laws enacted by this body." See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va.,
Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+amd+
HB1OASR (detailing rejected Senate amendments).
139. Compare H.B. 10, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010) (enacted as Act of Apr. 21,
2010, ch. 818, 2010 Va. Acts ___), with S.B. 283, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 10, 2010, ch. 106, 2010 Va. Acts J, and S.B. 311, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 2010) (enacted as Act of Mar. 10, 2010, ch. 107, 2010 Va. Acts _J, and
S.B. 417, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010) (enacted as Act of Mar. 10, 2010, ch. 108,
2010 Va. Acts .
140. Compare H.J. Res. 7, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010), with H.B. 10, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010) (enacted as Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch. 818, 2010 Va. Acts __),
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reconsidered in the 2012 Session,141 prohibited "any law [that] im-
pose[s] a penalty, tax, fee, or fine" upon an individual who de-
clines to enter into a contract "for health care coverage or to par-
ticipate in any particular health care system or plan."142 This
measure failed in the House Privileges and Elections committee
in mid-February, and it was never taken up again.14
4. House Joint Resolution 125
In a related action, the House of Delegates resoundingly passed
a resolution that urged Congress "to honor state sovereignty un-
der the Tenth Amendment . .. [and] claim[ed] [state] sovereign-
ty ... over all powers not otherwise enumerated and granted to
the federal government."144 The House Privileges and Elections
Committee and the Constitutional Subcommittee considered and
passed the Resolution, but it failed in the Senate Committee on
Rules the following month.145 Similar bills did not fare any better
in the 2010 Session.146
5. Opposition Laws: The Big Picture
Although politically savvy in the Commonwealth, opposition
laws like the ones passed in the 2010 Session are pure thea-
trics.147 Opposition laws, by operation of the Supremacy Clause of
available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504exe?101+ful+HB1O+pdf.
141. Any constitutional amendment must be passed by both houses, then "referred to
the General Assembly at its first regular session held after the next general election of
members of the House of Delegates." See VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
142. H.J. Res. 7, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010).
143. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=hj7 (detailing House
Joint Resolution 7).
144. See H.J. Res. 125, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010).
145. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504exe?101+sum+hj125. Based on the voting on House
Bill 10 and the similar senate bills, the Committee on Rules was 8-7 against the measure.
See generally supra notes 129, 136 and accompanying text.
146. For instance, House Joint Resolution 5 urged a similar message to Congress, but
that Resolution was left in the House Privileges and Elections Committee. See H.J. Res. 5,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010); H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess.
_ (2010), available at http:/leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=
hj5.
147. See, e.g., Mark Pugh, Letter To The Editor, States Can't Override Federal Legisla-
tion, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2010, at A10 (decrying wasted time and energy spent
on nullification bills).
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the U.S. Constitution, serve little to no legal purpose. 4 More di-
rectly, our system of government acknowledges the supremacy of
federal law over state law, so that as long as federal law is consti-
tutional, it trumps. 4 In other words, if the individual mandate is
unconstitutional, it can be challenged as such apart from state
opposition laws.
However, with its actions in the 2010 Session, Virginia sent
clear and relevant messages to Washington and Virginia's con-
gressional delegation. The five Democrat senators who voted for
House Bill 10'60 and related laws signify the unpopularity in Vir-
ginia of a federal bill containing the individual mandate. In addi-
tion, these state bills maintain momentum and encourage further
dissent in the overall opposition movement. Perhaps more power-
fully, the Virginia opposition laws provide state sponsorship of
mass civil disobedience to the federal government.
B. Attorney General Opinion
In early 2010, in an official opinion initiated by Lieutenant
Governor Bill Bolling, Attorney General Bill Mims 51 voiced con-
cerns about the constitutionality of the individual mandate and
the "Nebraska compromise" 152 contained in the Senate-approved
PPACA.'53 Mims had already joined attorneys general from twelve
other states in opposing the Nebraska compromise, and incoming
Attorney General Cuccinelli had already signaled his disapproval
148. Attorney General Cuccinelli claims that they lend unique standing to the Com-
monwealth, but this is tenuous at best. See generally Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to Motion to Dismiss, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10CV188-HEH, at 3
(E.D. Va. Jun. 7, 2010), ECF No. 28.
149. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 910
(10th Cir. 1995).
150. H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://
legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504exe?101+vot+SVO692HB0010+HBOO10; SENATE OF VA.,
MEMBERSHIP MAILING LIST, supra note 123 (providing party affiliations).
151. Ken Cuccinelli assumed office on January 16, 2010; Bill Mims-now a Virginia
Supreme Court Justice-was Attorney General until that time. See William C. Mims
Named to Virginia Supreme Court, 58 VIRGINIA LAWYER 20, Apr. 10, 2010; Biography of
Attorney General Cuccinelli, http://www.oag.state.va.us/CuccinellilAG_BIO.html (last vi-
sited Oct. 30, 2010); Biography of Attorney General Mims, http://www.oag.state.va.us/
MimsfMimsBio.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
152. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
153. See Tyler Whitley, Attorney General Questions Constitutionality of Mandated
Health Insurance Purchases, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 2010, at B8.
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of the individual mandate.154 In his opinion, which cites James
Madison's Federalist No. 45 and the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution, Mims echoed some prominent
academics and politicos in questioning the federal government's
ability to anchor these provisions to an enumerated Article I pow-
er.155 In particular, Mims challenged (1) the individual mandate
as an invalid exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce and (2) the Nebraska Compromise as a violation of the
General Welfare Clause.156
First, although conceding that Congress has broad power to re-
gulate commerce among the states, Mims concluded that "[t]he
insurance mandate is open to constitutional challenge" for possi-
bly exceeding the bounds of the Commerce Clause.' 7 Pinpointing
the vulnerability in the health care bill, Mims stated that
"[a]lthough health care is an economic activity, the failure to pur-
chase health insurance is not an economic activity."166 The Attor-
ney General rightly pointed out that the Supreme Court's recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is somewhat ambiguous and
perhaps alters years of precedent that allowed regulation of cer-
tain intrastate activities.59 With this in mind, Mims stated that
the success of such a challenge is far from clear.' Notably, Attor-
ney General Mims did not evaluate the individual mandate's con-
stitutionality as a tax,'6' as some commentators have suggested is
appropriate.162
Speaking to the Nebraska compromise, the Attorney General
rejected Bolling's suggestion that the Equal Protection Clause
was a viable ground for objection; instead, he pointed to Con-
gress's responsibility to spend money for the "'general Welfare of
154. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Virginia GOP Sets Sights on Thwarting Federal Poli-
cies: As General Assembly Convenes, Republicans Plan Bills on Guns, Health Care, WASH.
POST, Jan. 13, 2010, at Al.
155. Opinion Letter from Bill Mims, Attorney Gen. of Va., to Bill Bolling, Lieutenant
Governor of Va. (Jan. 11, 2010), http://billbolling.com/blog/post/1140 (hereinafter Mims
Letter].
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and
Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169, 178 (2010).
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the United States."'161 While again acknowledging that Congress
has broad latitude to exercise this power to spend for the general
welfare, Mims opined that "carving out an exception for a specific
state, unrelated to any policy objective other than to secure the
vote of a particular senator, would exceed the bounds of what
Congress may do under the Spending Clause."164 The Nebraska
compromise and other provisions that treated individual states
preferentially were ultimately dropped from the PPACA,165 ren-
dering the former Attorney General's advice moot.6 6
C. Lawsuits
1. Background
The objections raised by former Attorney General Bill Mims in
his opinion were reiterated by current Attorney General Cuccinel-
li in a March 23 suit filed against Kathleen Sebelius, in her offi-
cial capacity as Secretary of the DHHS.167 Cuccinelli's suit came
on the same day as a similar suit filed by Florida Attorney Gen-
eral Bill McCollum and joined by the attorneys general of twelve
other states (another seven attorneys general have since
joined).168 Cuccinelli's rationale for filing apart from McCollum
and the other attorneys general was to take advantage of the
Eastern District of Virginia's "Rocket Docket."169
163. Mims Letter, supra note 155 (quoting U.S. CONsT. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1).
164. Id.
165. Randy E. Barnett, Is Health-Care Reform Constitutional?, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2010, at B1 (providing provisions that favor individual states); Katie Connolly, Why the
'Louisiana Purchase'Isn't a Dirty Backroom Deal, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 201), http://www.
newsweek.com/blogs/the-gaggle/2010/03/21/why-the-louisiana-purchase-isn-t-a-dirty-back
room-deal.html (explaining why the 'Louisiana Purchase' does not favor Louisiana alone);
Devin Dwyer et al., Health Care Bill: Political Winners & Losers, ABCNEWS, Mar. 22,
2010, http://abcnews.go.comlPolitics/HealthCare/health-care-bill-political-winners-losers/st
ory?id=10169856 (explaining that the 'Louisiana Purchase' survived revisions of the bill).
The reconciliation bill, signed into law by the President on March 30, 2010, eliminated the
Nebraska Compromise. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
111-152, § 1201, 124 Stat. 1029, 1051-52 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d).
166. See Mims Letter, supra note 155.
167. See generally Virginia Complaint, supra note 26.
168. See Jennifer Kay, States Respond in Healthcare Overhaul Lawsuit, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 7, 2010, at A2 (summarizing arguments and listing states involved).
See generally Florida Complaint, supra note 114.
169. See Cuccinelli Talks About Planned Health Care Reform Lawsuit, WSLS1.COM,
Mar. 22, 2010, http://www2.wsls.com/news/2010/mar/22/cuccinelli-talksabout plan to_
filelawsuit over h-ar-367500/. It is significant that a separate suit has been filed in the
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In his complaint, Cuccinelli requests declaratory and injunctive
relief from the individual mandate contained in section 1501 of
the PPACA.7 0 Contending that the mandate exceeds the scope of
Congress's reach under the Commerce Clause, the suit asks for a
declaration that the mandate is void as unconstitutional and, be-
cause it is not severable from the Act as a whole, that the entire
PPACA is unconstitutional. 7 ' Specifically citing United States v.
Lopez 71 and United States v. Morrison,73 the complaint alleges
that, like in those cases, the mandate should be struck down as
regulation of noncommercial activity based on questionable ef-
fects on interstate commerce.17' Specifically, Cuccinelli's com-
plaint alleges that "[t]he status of being a citizen or resident of
the Commonwealth of Virginia is not a channel of interstate
commerce; nor a person or thing in interstate commerce; nor is it
an activity arising out of or connected with a commercial transac-
tion."175 The complaint also highlights the conflict between the
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act and the individual mandate,16
most likely in the hope of bolstering the Commonwealth's stand-
ing to bring suit. This juxtaposition also highlights the federalism
argument underlying the entire suit. Unlike Florida's suit, Cucci-
nelli's does not challenge the individual mandate as an invalid
exercise of Congress's power to tax.'77 The Virginia case is cur-
rently assigned to District Judge Henry Hudson, 78 who denied
Eastern District of Virginia. Because it is faster than the other federal districts slated to
hear challenges, the Eastern District will likely reach a disposition sooner and thus estab-
lish persuasive precedent for the other suits. As such, the Eastern District of Virginia is
uniquely situated to exert influence on the outcome of not just the Virginia challenge, but
the others as well. See, e.g., Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A
Working Solution for Civil Justice Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1998).
170. See Virginia Complaint, supra note 26, at 6-7.
171. See id. at 5-6.
172. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that provisions in the Gun Free School Zones
Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause).
173. 529 U.S. 598, 605, 627 (2000) (holding that portions of the Violence Against Wom-
en Act were unconstitutional because they exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power).
174. See Virginia Complaint, supra note 26, at 5-6.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 2.
177. Compare id. at 5-7 (noting the lack of any tax-based complaint), with Florida
Complaint, supra note 114, at 17-18 (directly raising the tax issue).
178. See Julian Walker, Judge in Vick's Dogfighting Case Assigned to Anti-Health-Bill
Suit, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 26, 2010, at A8. The Virginia suit was originally assigned to
Robert E. Payne, who recused himself on March 23 for undisclosed reasons. Id.
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the federal government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim in early August
2010. 19
2. Other Suits
A third suit was also filed on March 23, challenging the indi-
vidual mandate on behalf of a nonprofit organization associated
with Liberty University and eight individuals in the Western Dis-
trict of Virginia ("Liberty suit").so The merits of these three law-
suits-two in Virginia and one in Florida-are somewhat similar,
but the parties and jurisdiction of each may be relevant to key
procedural issues."1
The Florida and Liberty suits are more expansive in their subs-
tantive allegations. For instance, the Florida suit challenges the
PPACA as violating principles of federalism generally',2 and the
prohibition on unapportioned capitation taxes specifically.18 The
latter of these arguments is seen by some as the strongest basis
for attacking the PPACA.18 4 The Liberty suit adds complaints of
Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clause viola-
tions, among others, for exempting select religions from the indi-
vidual mandate and funding abortions with money collected by
operation of the individual mandate.15
Finally, the Goldwater Institute initiated a suit in Arizona on
August 12 ("Goldwater suit").1s In addition to the Commerce
Clause and Taxing and Spending Clause challenges mentioned
above, the Goldwater suit makes at least three unique constitu-
tional arguments against the PPACA. First, the Goldwater suit
alleges that the PPACA violates the individual rights to medical
179. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601, 615 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 2, 2010).
180. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Preliminary and Permanent In-
junctive Relief, Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm (Apr. 14,
2010) [hereinafter Liberty Complaint] (amending the original complaint filed on Mar. 23,
2010).
181. See infra notes 226-48 and accompanying text.
182. See Florida Complaint, supra note 114, at 15-17.
183. See id. at 17-18.
184. See, e.g., Willis & Chung, supra note 162, at 169, 170, 178.
185. See Liberty Complaint, supra note 180, at 28-35.
186. See generally Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Coons
v. Geithner, No. 2:10-cv-01714 (Aug. 12, 2010), ECF No. 1.
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autonomy and privacy guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments.,s, In short, the Goldwater Institute contends
that under the PPACA, health insurance options and autonomy
to make personal health care decisions will be gradually re-
stricted.188 Second, the Goldwater suit contends that the PPACA
violates the First Amendment rights of Arizona's elected repre-
sentatives by establishing a new agency-the Independent Pay-
ment Advisory Board ("IPAB")-which has sweeping authority to
set health care costs and cannot be repealed by Congress, except
for a brief window in 2017.189 The Goldwater suit argues that the
new agency deprives Arizona representatives of their constitu-
tional right and responsibility to act in the best interests of Ari-
zona citizens.90 Third, the Goldwater suit charges that the IPAB
violates separation of powers principles because it is not subject
to meaningful oversight by the courts or Congress.'
Most recently, a federal district judge in the Northern District
of Florida refused to dismiss the lawsuit filed by Florida Attorney
General Bill McCollum and other state attorneys general.'92 On
October 14, 2010, Judge Vinson made two strong rulings against
the United States.** First, he firmly rejected the argument that
the individual mandate is a tax, citing numerous indicators in the
text of the PPACA itself.19 Second, Judge Vinson indicated his
agreement with the plaintiffs that the PPACA represents an un-
precedented exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.'' In
187. Id. at 37-42.
188. See id. at 39-40.
189. Id. at 25, 28-29, 46.
190. See id. at 45-46.
191. See id. at 64.
192. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2010 WL 4010119,
at *36 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss counts one and
four of the complaint).
193. See id. at *12, *34-35.
194. See id. at *12 ("[It 'clearly appears' from the statute itself ... that Congress did
not intend to impose a tax when it imposed the penalty. To hold otherwise would require
me to look beyond the plain words of the statute. I would have to ignore that Congress: (i)
specifically changed the term in previous incarnations of the statute from 'tax' to 'penalty;'
(ii) used the term 'tax' in describing the several other exactions provided for in the Act; (iii)
specifically relied on and identified its Commerce Clause power and not its taxing power;
(iv) eliminated traditional IRS enforcement methods for the failure to pay the 'tax;' and (v)
failed to identify in the legislation any revenue that would be raised from it, notwithstand-
ing that at least seventeen other revenue-generating provisions were specifically so identi-
fied.").
195. See id. at *34 ("At this stage in the litigation, this is not even a close call.... This
case law is instructive, but ultimately inconclusive because the Commerce Clause and Ne-
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essence, the foundational arguments of the Florida lawsuit re-
main intact. Motions for summary judgment will be heard before
Judge Vinson on December 16, 2010.196
Because they are the primary arguments in all four suits, and
in the Virginia suit especially, this article details only the Com-
merce Clause and Taxing challenges.
3. Merits
As should be obvious by now, constitutional challenges to the
PPACA speak less to health care policy and more to the proper
role of national government under our Constitution. As all three
suits hastily recognize, the federal government is of limited pow-
ers, unable to regulate unless specifically empowered to do so by
the Constitution.9 7
a. Commerce Clause Challenge
The primary authority for Congress to act is found in the
Commerce Clause, which entitles the national legislature to regu-
late commerce between the states.198 Until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the Commerce Clause was narrowly construed, reaching on-
ly commerce that physically crossed state lines or utilized the
channels or instrumentalities of commerce, such as highways and
cargo ships.199 That changed in Wickard v. Filburn, a watershed
case in which the Supreme Court permitted Congress to regulate
purely local activity provided it has "a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce." 200 Under this broader reading of the
Commerce Clause, federal legislation went virtually unchallenged
cessary and Proper Clause have never been applied in such a manner before. The power
that the individual mandate seeks to harness is simply without prior precedent.").
196. See Amended Final Scheduling Order, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. Sebelius, No.
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010), ECF No. 76.
197. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 97 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003) ("[The federal government's] jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects,
which concern all the members of the republic, ... [and] subordinate governments, which
can extend their care to all those other objects which can be separately provided for, will
retain their due authority and activity.").
198. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
199. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (2010); see, e.g., Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
200. 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that purely intrastate activity can be regulated
under the Commerce Clause if it would affect interstate commerce when cumulated).
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until the Rehnquist Court intervened in Lopezo0 and Morrison.202
In both of those cases, the Supreme Court struck down federal
laws purporting to regulate intrastate activities because they had
only speculative impact on interstate commerce. 20 3
More recently, in Gonzalez v. Raich, the Supreme Court held
that Congress may regulate local activity if doing so is "'an essen-
tial part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activi-
ty were regulated."' 2 04 This holding was seen by many as the re-
turn to the Court's more lenient Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
but that assumption has yet to be affirmed by the Supreme Court
itself.205
Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, then, allows Con-
gress to regulate (1) the use of channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and (2) any activity-whether interstate or
intrastate-having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 206
Congress may additionally control local activities that are neces-
sary for effective regulation of interstate commerce. 20 7 However,
purely noneconomic, local activity that has tenuous effects on in-
terstate commerce cannot be regulated by Congress-this is the
teaching of Lopez and Morrison.208
201. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
202. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
203. See id. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Under the [speculative] theories that the
Government presents in support of [its power], it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power. . . .").
204. 545 U.S. 1, 23-25 (2005) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
205. See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second
Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 232-33
(2009); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
859, 889-90 (2009).
206. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution
to the Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 510 (2010).
207. Accord Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of
the Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 1991 (2008) ("If the regu-
lated activity is noneconomic, the Court first asks whether Congress has occupied the field
with a regulatory scheme that deals with interstate commercial activity. Second, it asks
whether regulation of the noneconomic activity is necessary to prevent the broader regula-
tory scheme from being undercut.").
208. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 617-18 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68).
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Many lawmakers are aware of this scheme, and they specifical-
ly hooked the individual mandate to the language of Lopez and
Morrison:
The [individual mandate] regulates activity that is commercial and
economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and
when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is pur-
chased. Health insurance and health care services are a significant
part of the national economy. . .. Since most health insurance is sold
by national or regional health insurance companies, health insur-
ance is sold in interstate commerce and claims payments flow
through interstate commerce.20 9
This, according to Cuccinelli and other dissenters, is where the
analysis breaks down. Patently, the activities that Congress is
purporting to regulate in the PPACA are the decisions whether,
how, and when to obtain health care and health insurance. This
necessarily includes the decision not to enter the health insur-
ance market in the first place, which, according to Cuccinelli,
amounts to inactivity regardless of the effects on interstate com-
merce.2o In other words, "[t]he status of being a citizen. . . is en-
tirely passive."",
The opposition's response is not overly difficult to imagine: re-
maining uninsured is actually an activity-namely, that of self-
insuring and self-medicating rather than purchasing insurance.212
Not only that, remaining uninsured is an economic activity.213 And
once the decision to self-insure is framed as an activity, Gonzalez
provides the language to bring the individual mandate within
congressional authority. That is, prohibiting self-insurance is es-
sential to the success of the PPACA-which is presumably a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause-and the entire endeavor would
209. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2)(A), (B), 124 Stat. 119, 242-43 (2010) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (emphasis added).
210. See Virginia Complaint, supra note 26, at 5.
211. Id.
212. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health
Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482, 483 (2010) ("Critics charge that these people are
not engaged in any activity that Congress might regulate; they are simply doing nothing.
This is not the case. Such people actually self-insure through various means. When unin-
sured people get sick, they rely on their families for financial support, go to emergency
rooms (often passing costs on to others), or purchase over-the-counter remedies. They
substitute these activities for paying premiums to health insurance companies. All these
activities are economic, and they have a cumulative effect on interstate commerce.").
213. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (E.D. Va. Aug.
2, 2010) ("'[C]onsuming health care services without paying for them is activity, plain and
simple."' (quoting counsel for Secretary Sebelius at oral argument)).
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be undercut if Congress was unable to regulate it. Therefore, per
Gonzalez, Congress is able to invoke the Necessary and Proper
Clause for authority to enact the individual mandate.
This explanation is problematic for at least three reasons.
First, it is not an accurate reflection of Congress's command. Sec-
tion 1501 of the PPACA states: "If an applicable individual fails
to meet the requirement of [maintaining minimum essential cov-
erage contained in] subsection (a) for 1 or more months during
any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, . . . there is hereby
imposed a penalty with respect to the individual . .. "14 Congress
acknowledged that it was penalizing inactivity, and it plainly in-
tended to do so.",, Second, the Commerce Clause has never been
utilized to compel citizens to purchase goods or services, as is
necessarily the case here.2 16 No matter how language from the
Court's Gonzalez opinion is harnessed by supporters of the
mandate, the absence of direct precedent lends credibility to the
challenge. Third, it is difficult to glean a limiting principle in the
Commerce Clause if the individual mandate is upheld. If Con-
gress successfully requires the purchase of health insurance by
all Americans, it will have reached individual "inactivity that is
expressly designed to avoid entry into the relevant market."2 17 If
failure to obtain health insurance is deemed interstate commerce,
it is hard to fathom acts of omission that could not be tied to other
national deficiencies and thus be subject to federal regulation.2 18
b. Taxing and Spending Challenge
Although the Obama Administration and congressional Demo-
crats initially insisted that the individual mandate contained in
214. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 244 (2010) (to be codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) (emphasis added).
215. See generally id.
216. See Jost, supra note 112, at 871 (citing Balkin, supra note 212, at 482-83).
217. RANDY BARNETT ET AL., WHY THE PERSONAL MANDATE To BuY HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE IS UNPRECEDENTED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HERITAGE FOUND. 7 (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/12/Why-the-Personal-Mandate-to-Buy-
Health-Insurance-Is-Unprecedented-and-Unconstitutional (emphasis omitted).
218. For instance, what if Congress wants to halve the price of cars because its elected
officials decide everyone has a fundamental right to drive if they desire to? In this hypo-
thetical, in order to implement and fund the plan, everyone must buy a General Motors
automobile or pay a $1000 penalty. This example is similar to the health care mandate,
but it opens a door that many Americans want shut and locked.
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section 1501 of the PPACA was not a tax (rather, a penalty), ad-
ministration attorneys began heavily emphasizing Congress's
power to tax as the linchpin of their legal case in July 2010.19 It is
apparent from the detailed congressional findings in the PPACA
itself, as well as the analysis of the bill performed by Congress's
Joint Committee on Taxation, that Congress did not originally act
with the intention of invoking its power to tax and spend.2 2 0 In-
stead, Congress detailed specific findings that the health care
market is integral to the American economy and that participa-
tion in that market is unavoidable, clearly invoking its Commerce
Clause power. 221 And like the Obama Administration, without ex-
ception the Joint Committee on Taxation referred to the mandate
as a "penalty," not a "tax," in its March 2010 financial report to
Congress. 222 However, while making the tax argument is political-
ly disadvantageous and arguably dishonest, it may provide the
strongest ground for upholding the PPACA.22 3
Although not pleaded in the Commonwealth's suit, the Liberty
and Florida lawsuits allege that the PPACA violates the prohibi-
tion against unapportioned capitation or direct taxes set forth in
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.2 1 Rather than a tax on in-
come or a tax on activity (excise tax), the Liberty suit states that
the tax levied on individuals refusing to purchase health insur-
ance is a capitation tax--one assessed against the person just for
219. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10CV188, at 19:16-17 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2010), ECF No.
81.
220. However, the provision's location in Title 26 of the U.S. Code-the Internal Reve-
nue Code-supports the tax power argument. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501(b),
124 Stat. 119, 242-49 (2010) (amended 2010) (to be codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §
5000A); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH
THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," J. COMM. DOC. No. JCX-18-10, at
33 (2010), available at http://www.jet.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673.
221. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(A)-(H), 124 Stat. 119, 242-44 (2010) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1809).
222. See J. COMM. DOC. NO. JCX-18-10, supra note 220, at 31-34. It was not until May
2010 that the Joint Committee on Taxation revised its vocabulary, referring to the penalty
as an excise tax. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ERRATA FOR JCX-18-10, J. COMM. Doc. No.
JCX-27-10, at 2 (2010).
223. See, e.g., Pear, supra note 98 (quoting legal scholars as stating President Obama
has been dishonest about the nature of the insurance mandate, but the mandate may be a
constitutional tax).
224. See Florida Complaint, supra note 114, at 17-18; Liberty Complaint, supra note
180, at 35-36.
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existing.225 As opposed to its nearly boundless freedom to lay in-
come taxes, in assessing capitation taxes Congress is more great-
ly restricted by the Constitution. Specifically, capitation taxes
must be apportioned among the states according to population as
calculated by the census.22 6 To pass constitutional muster, then,
the PPACA tax would need to be apportioned among the states
evenly, so that each state pays a percent of the total tax equal to
its portion of the total population. This is not the case,227 and un-
der the current structure, states with large populations of poor or
wealthy individuals might not pay their fair share. As Steven J.
Willis and Nakku Chung aptly explain:
Louisiana has approximately 4.5 million residents. Suppose 150,000
in 2014 owe the lack-of-health-insurance tax. The total amount due
would be $14,250,000 from Louisianans. The per capita amount
would be $3.17. Vermont has approximately 621,760 residents. Sup-
pose 500 persons in 2014 owe the lack-of-health-insurance tax. The
total amount due would be $47,500 from Vermonters. The per capita
amount would be 8 cents. Because the Louisiana amount would dif-
fer from the Vermont amount, the tax would not satisfy the appor-
tionment requirement. 2 8
The rejoinder to this argument will probably be that the tax is
not a capitation tax, but instead qualifies as a valid excise tax. As
such, the retort goes, it can be assessed disproportionately. The
trouble with this argument is that excise taxes must be laid on
activities, such as buying cigarettes or inheriting money, not
against individuals. 229 This tax, although called an excise tax by
Congress, is unlike any existing excise tax because it applies to a
failure to act by the general population. 23o It is more appropriately
a direct tax, subject to the constitutional limitations set forth
above.
225. See Liberty Complaint, supra note 180, at 35.
226. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 4; see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206
(1920) (constitutional limitations on direct taxes are not abrogated by Sixteenth Amend-
ment).
227. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
228. Willis & Chung, supra note 162, at 193 (footnotes omitted).
229. See Rivkin, Jr., Casey, & Balkin, supra note 101, at 111 (arguing that characteriz-
ing the mandate penalty as an excise tax is "intellectually incoherent").
230. See Willis & Chung, supra note 162, at 170.
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4. Procedural Considerations
Even if the suits are eventually successful, they may run into
procedural difficulties in the near future, namely standing and
ripeness concerns. In the summer of 2010, the Virginia suit sur-
vived the Obama Administration's motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, lack of a ripe dispute, and failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.231 Administration attorneys will
certainly reiterate and refine these concerns in motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment in the fall of 2010 and beyond, hoping
for dismissal of the remaining suits without reaching their me-
rits. Early dismissal certainly will be advantageous for the Ob-
ama Administration because negative public perception of health
care reform may continue to increase with the passage of time.23 2
a. Standing
Federal courts can entertain only suits initiated by individuals
who have "standing,"23 3 which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
(1) past or imminent injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to
and thus caused by the defendant's allegedly unlawful behavior,
and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judgment.24 The in-
dividual mandate requires individuals and most employers to ob-
tain or provide health insurance or pay a penalty.235 It is fairly
231. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601-02, 615 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 12, 2010); see also infra notes 235-56 and accompanying text.
232. Public support for health care reform efforts has, by all accounts, declined signifi-
cantly since the legislation's passage in early 2010. Compare Lydia Saad, By Slim Margin,
Americans Support Healthcare Bill's Passage, GALLUP (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.gall
up.com/poll/126929/Slim-Margin-Americans-Support-Healthcare-Bill-Passage.aspx (report
ing that, as of March 2010, 49% of American adults favored the PPACA and 40% disap-
proved of it), with Health Care Law: 56% Favor Repeal of Health Care Law, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.comlpublic-contentipolitics/current
events/healthcare/health care_1aw (Aug. 9, 2010) (reporting that "support for repeal [of
the PPACA] has ranged from 52% to 63% since the he [sic] law was passed by Congress in
March [2010]").
233. Standing is derived from the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III,
which embodies the idea of separation of powers foundational to our system of govern-
ment. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76
(1982)).
234. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations
omitted).
235. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L.
111-203 and P.L. 111-240)).
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straightforward, then, that the individual and employer plaintiffs
in the Michigan suit have standing to sue.236 The mandate will re-
quire them to pay for health insurance, an economic injury; that
injury is clearly caused by section 1501 of the PPACA; and a dec-
laratory judgment finding the PPACA unconstitutional will re-
dress that economic harm."'
It is less clear whether Virginia and Florida similarly have
standing to sue in their respective suits. This is because the indi-
vidual mandate does not directly injure the states, but merely
imposes obligations that may indirectly cost them money."'
Standing doctrine in American jurisprudence generally does not
recognize such claims of speculative, indirect injury.1"
However, the states' position may be improved by the recent
standing case Massachusetts v. EPA.24 0 In that case, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that states have standing to sue the federal
government in order to protect their sovereign and quasi-
sovereign interests.24 1 The liberal bloc of the Court went on to
proclaim that a state's stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign in-
terests "is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis,"
essentially agreeing to loosen the standing analysis for states in
certain circumstances.2 42 In the same breath, however, the Court
declared that "there is a critical difference between allowing a
State 'to protect her citizens from the operation of federal sta-
tutes' (which is what [Massachusetts v.] Mellon243 prohibits) and
allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it
236. See generally Complaint, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Sebelius, No. 2:10-cv-11156-
GCS-RSW (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Michigan Complaint], ECF No. 1.
237. See id. at 2-3. The Michigan suit was recently dismissed on its merits by District
Judge George Steeh. That the suit was not dismissed for procedural defects supports the
conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-
CV-11156-GCS-RSW, 2010 WL 3962805 at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010).
238. Indeed, the Florida Complaint attempts to establish standing despite this, claim-
ing immediate administrative costs: "The [PPACA] effectively requires that Florida imme-
diately begin to devote funds and resources to implement the Act's sweeping reforms
across multiple agencies of government." See Florida Complaint, supra note 114, at 14.
239. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 ("[T]here must be a causal connection between the in-
jury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly . . . trace[able] to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant, and not . .. th[e] result [ofJ the independent action of some
third party not before the court."') (alteration in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
240. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
241. Id. at 520 & n.17.
242. Id.
243. 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
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has standing to do)."2 4 Given this dichotomy, it seems likely that
state challenges to the individual mandate based on the Com-
merce Clause will be rejected as nothing more than attempts to
protect citizens from the operation of the PPACA.245 A state would
more likely have standing to challenge the mandate as a tax in
violation of the constitutional requirement that direct taxes be
apportioned among the states according to the census-a provi-
sion that more clearly protects and benefits states' and state so-
vereign's interests.2 1 Under either of these scenarios, states will
face difficulty overcoming established precedent holding that
states lack the power to challenge the constitutionality of federal
law on behalf of their citizens.2 41
b. Ripeness
The other procedural hurdle for healthcare suits is whether
they are ripe for judicial intervention. Ripeness considerations
usually arise when, as here, preenforcement review of a statute is
sought.248 In such circumstances, courts will generally intervene if
(1) a controversy presents a question of law fit for judicial deci-
sion and (2) a party would be negatively impacted by withholding
or postponing judicial consideration of the matter. 249 In other
words, if injuries are so speculative or insignificant that they may
never occur, a court should decline to adjudicate the dispute as
unripe. Under this analysis, individual plaintiffs challenging the
244. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17 (citing Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)).
245. On the other hand, it is possible to view these challenges as states asserting their
right to control intrastate activities under the Tenth Amendment, which is a sovereign
interest presumably entitled to "special solicitude" in the standing analysis.
246. See Memorandum from Bill McCollum, Attorney Gen. of Fla. to Harry Reid, Se-
nate Majority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mitch
McConnell, Senate Minority Leader, and John Boehner, House Minority Leader (Jan. 19,
2010) at 4, http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsflWF/MARAY-7ZUMTANW/$file/HealthCare
Memo.pdf. Furthermore, framing the injury in these terms-that is challenging the me-
thod in which the mandate is levied rather than its applicability to state citizens-makes
standing more likely. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17.
247. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Opinion, Sanction the 18 State AGs, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
12, 2010, at 43 (citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 483-85).
248. See, e.g., United Public Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-89 (1947).
249. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) ("[The] ba-
sic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.").
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health insurance mandate (like those in the Michigan suit) will
probably run into ripeness problems because it does not take ef-
fect until 2014.250 Because the PPACA is unlikely to be repealed or
amended in the next four years, these individual plaintiffs are
probably unable to demonstrate hardship from postponing the
case until after the mandate takes effect. As such, they will likely
fail to present a controversy ripe for adjudication.51
State plaintiffs, on the other hand, will likely prevail in the
ripeness analysis because they can more readily show hardship
from postponing suit. That is, if states implement the PPACA
without knowing whether the individual mandate imposed by the
statute is valid, they risk wasting substantial state funds.2 52 This
could impose a palpable and considerable hardship on the state,
and this argument lends credence to the ripeness of the contro-
versy. This is precisely the argument that Virginia Attorney Gen-
eral Cuccinelli mounted in opposition to the federal government's
motion to dismiss, and Judge Hudson embraced the rationale.25 3
5. Judge Hudson's August 2010 Memorandum Opinion
On August 2, 2010, Judge Hudson refused to dismiss the Vir-
ginia suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction-based on stand-
ing and ripeness arguments-or for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted.254 While the decision is not a resolu-
tion on the merits of the case, it represents a victory for Virginia
in the first of many hurdles to come. The remainder of this sec-
tion is devoted to a discussion of the district court's ruling on
250. See generally Michigan Complaint, supra note 236.
251. The individuals may, however, be able to show that any hardship on the state
would ultimately work harm on its citizens. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1983) ("To require the industry to
proceed without knowing whether the moratorium is valid would impose a palpable and
considerable hardship on the utilities, and may ultimately work harm on the citizens of
California.").
252. See Zachary Roth, Behind the Lawsuit. Florida AG Turned to Beltway Fixture-
and Old Lobbying Pal-for Health-Care Challenge, TALKINGPOINTSMEMO, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/03/behind thejlawsuit floridaag-tur
ned-to-beltway.fi.php.
253. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (E.D. Va. Aug.
2, 2010).
254. See id. at 601, 615.
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standing, ripeness, and the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
claims.255
First, the district court held that Virginia had standing to
bring its lawsuit based on the Virginia Health Care Freedom
Act-its opposition law-and the state's interest in enforcing that
law.216 The opinion succinctly summarizes the federal govern-
ment's argument:
The Secretary marginalizes the conflict between Section 1501 [of the
PPACA] and the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act as a political
policy dispute manufactured for the sole purpose of creating stand-
ing. The resulting abstract policy dispute causes no imminent injury
to the sovereign and is thus insufficient to support standing to chal-
lenge a federal enactment.2 5 7
Furthermore, the federal government challenged that Virginia
was actually prosecuting the case on behalf of its citizens, and
acting in such a parens patriae capacity vis-A-vis the federal gov-
ernment that was forbidden by the Supreme Court nearly a cen-
tury ago.258 The Commonwealth rejected that it was acting on be-
half of its citizens, and instead asserted injury to its sovereign
interest in enforcing its duly enacted laws as the basis of stand-
ing.259 Judge Hudson agreed with the Commonwealth, stating:
Although this lawsuit has the collateral effect of protecting the indi-
vidual interests of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, its
primary articulated objective is to defend the Virginia Health Care
Freedom Act from the conflicting effect of an allegedly unconstitu-
tional federal law. Despite its declaratory nature, it is a lawfully-
enacted part of the laws of Virginia. The purported transparent leg-
islative intent underlying its enactment is irrelevant. The mere exis-
tence of the lawfully-enacted statute is sufficient to trigger the duty
of the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law and the asso-
ciated sovereign power to enact it.2 6 0
255. Judge Hudson heard motions for summary judgment in the case on October 18,
2010. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No.3:10CV188-HEH (E.D. Va. summary
judgment argued Oct. 18, 2010), ECF No. 156.
256. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 605-07 (quoting Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United
States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)).
257. Id. at 602 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923)).
258. Id. (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86; citing id. at 485).
259. Id. at 602-03 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986)).
260. Id. 605-06.
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The district court found Virginia's challenge to be more akin to a
sovereign asserting its own rights rather than those of its citi-
zens, focusing on Virginia's power to create and enforce a binding
legal code and the federal government's interference with that
power in an arguably unconstitutional manner."' In the district
court's opinion, such interference amounts to sufficient injury-in-
fact to satisfy Article III's standing requirement.262
Second, the district court found the dispute was ripe for re-
view. 2 63 Although the individual mandate does not go into effect
until 2014, the court observed, "the Commonwealth must revamp
its health care program to ensure compliance with the enact-
ment's provisions, particularly with respect to Medicaid. This
process will entail more than simple fine tuning."2 64 In other
words, because the injury to Virginia in this case is the collision
of state and federal law, and because the federal government has
clearly indicated its intent to enforce the individual mandate on
Virginia citizens despite contrary state law, the impending injury
is more than a mere possibility and is thus ripe for review. 265
Third, the district court found that Virginia had successfully
argued a legally viable case, sufficient to move forward. 26 6 Stress-
ing that the parties put forth widely divergent arguments and in-
terpretations of precedent, the court reduced the case to "the sin-
gle question of whether or not Congress has the power to
regulate-and tax-a citizen's decision not to participate in inter-
state commerce."267 After rehashing the arguments on both sides
of this question, the district court determined that no Supreme
Court or U.S. Court of Appeals case had extended either the
Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause to the ex-
tent sought by the federal government, and, for that reason, the
case required additional proceedings.2 6
261. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982);
Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 476-77 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242).
262. Id. 606-07 (quoting Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242).
263. Id. at 608.
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960); Int'l Longshoremen's
Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954)) (citing Virginia v. Am. Booksellers
Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)).
266. See id. at 615.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 612, 615.
752010]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
While it is important to keep in mind that Judge Hudson's opi-
nion merely declines to terminate the lawsuit early, strands of
the opinion may shed light on future proceedings-or at least the
judge's current stance on the subjects of those future proceedings.
Importantly, the opinion focused on-and seemingly accepted-
the Commonwealth of Virginia's characterization of the Com-
merce Clause analysis.2 ,9 For instance, the opinion describes the
Lopez and Morrison decisions as "limit[ing] the boundaries of
Commerce Clause jurisdiction to activities truly economic in na-
ture and that actually affect interstate commerce." 2 0 This is pre-
sumably in contrast to the case at hand, where the regulation is
perhaps not truly economic or actually an activity affecting inter-
state commerce. That notion is bolstered by the judge's discussion
of the Commonwealth's argument, and especially his characteri-
zation of that argument as the federal government attempting to
regulate "a virtual state of repose-or idleness-the converse of
activity."271 Later, in stating that the relevant precedent is incon-
clusive, the district court stated that "[n]ever before has the
Commerce Clause. . . been extended this far."272 And most stri-
kingly, the court practically opens its analysis of the Commerce
Clause issue by stating, "[t]he congressional enactment under re-
view.. . literally forges new ground and extends Commerce
Clause powers beyond their current high watermark."27 3 Each of
these instances indicates that Judge Hudson sympathizes with
the Commonwealth of Virginia, or that at least he finds merit in
the Commonwealth's framing of the Commerce Clause challenge.
A second observation from the opinion is perhaps the most im-
portant aspect of the lawsuit going forward. Near the beginning
of the discussion regarding the sufficiency of Virginia's claims,
the district court noted that "[w]hile this Court's decision may set
the initial judicial course of this case, it will certainly not be the
final word."2 74 Without a doubt, regardless of the outcome in the
Eastern District of Virginia, the Virginia lawsuit will be appealed
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of the United States probably will be sought.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 610 (emphasis added) (citing 514 U.S. 549 (1995); 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 612.
273. Id. at 609.
274. Id.
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IV. ADDITIONAL HURDLES
A. Enforcement Problems
Even if the individual mandate survives constitutional chal-
lenge, the federal government faces the difficulty of collecting the
penalties it imposes. This difficulty is due in large part to the
U.S. Senate's decision to waive criminal penalties and forbid the
imposition of liens or levies on taxpayer property for failure to
pay.275 In searching for a solution, IRS officials recently stated
that although "[t]he Internal Revenue Service won't audit you to
make sure you have purchased health insurance under provisions
of the new health-care law . .. it may withhold your tax refund if
you can't demonstrate that you are insured . ... "276 While this
measure may be effective for most Americans since they receive a
federal refund sizeable enough to pay the penalty ($695 per unin-
sured),2 77 it will not reach everyone-namely those individuals not
entitled to an ample refund or any refund at all. For these indi-
viduals, compliance with the individual mandate will be largely
voluntary. And the unpopularity of the individual mandate in
Virginia may indicate that civil disobedience is forthcoming, a
possibility that could cost the federal government.271
Of course, if the mandate penalty proves too difficult to enforce,
congressional Democrats could always increase income taxes to
fund the PPACA. But this alternative presumably was avoided in
the 111th Congress because of the political unpopularity of rais-
ing taxes in a recession.
275. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119, 242-49 (2010) (amended
2010) (to be codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
276. Martin Vaughan, IRS May Withhold Tax Refunds To Enforce Health-Care Law,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023045100045
75186082454662468.html.
277. Id.
278. The fact that five Democrat state senators voted for the Virginia Health Care
Freedom Act indicates just how unpopular the federal mandate is with Virginians. See S.
JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. - (2010), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp 504.exe?101+vot+SP0143 (showing voting records of Virginia Senators on Senate
Bill 417); 2010 SENATE OF VA., MEMBERSHIP MAILING LIST, supra note 123 (providing par-
ty affiliations); see also Rosalind S. Helderman, Virginia Senate Bills Say No To Requiring
Health Insurance, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2010, at Al.
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B. Constitutional Amendment
Under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, the states can call a
convention for the purpose of proposing constitutional amend-
ments.27 To succeed, any proposed amendment must be ratified
by three-fourths of the states, which requires passage by both
houses in thirty-eight state legislatures.280 Interest in calling a
constitutional convention is growing in many states, but the
overwhelming difficulty of amending the Constitution using this
mechanism is daunting."' These odds did not stop the Virginia
House of Delegates from considering a Joint Resolution during
the 2010 Session to call just such a convention.2 2 While the
measure was left in the House Privileges and Elections Commit-
tee,"2 1 it is meaningful that Virginia's representatives are even
considering a convention-perhaps again signifying the dissatis-
faction with current federal action generally and the individual
mandate in particular.284 And even if a convention is never held,
the call to do so from states like Virginia, Florida, South Carolina,
and Rhode Island invariably places pressure on Washington.
C. Congressional Amendment or Repeal
The final hurdle for the PPACA is surviving the 2010 and 2012
congressional elections. Preliminary predictions indicate midterm
losses for Democrats in both chambers of Congress, but the sever-
ity of those losses remains to be seen.2 15 By most accounts, howev-
279. U.S. CONST. art. V.
280. Id. Nebraska has a unicameral legislature, so ratification in that state requires
approval of only one body. James M. LeMunyon, A Constitutional Convention Can Rein In
Washington, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2010, at A19.
281. For example, Florida Senate Bill 10 calls for a U.S. Constitutional Convention to
address financial responsibility in the federal government, including health reform costs.
S. Con. Res. 10, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010), 2010 Fla. Laws_.
282. See H.J. Reg. 183, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010).
283. H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va., Reg. Sess. (2010), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us./cgi-bin/legp504exe?101+sum+HJ183.
284. See LeMunyon, supra note 280.
285. See, e.g., 2010 Election Maps-Battle for the House, REAL CLEAR POLITICs, http://
www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2010/house/2010_elections house-map.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2010) (forecasting 190 Democrat victories, 207 Republican victories, and 38 '"Toss
Ups"); 2010 Election Maps-Senate No Toss Ups, REAL CLEAR POLITIcs, http://www.real
clearpolitics.comlepolls/2010/senate/2010_-electionssenatemap_no-toss-ups.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2010) (forecasting 51 Democrat Senators and 49 Republican Senators).
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er, it is possible for Republicans to reclaim majorities in both
chambers this year.2 16 If this happens, repeal measures are sure
to be introduced in Congress, and they are equally certain to be
filibustered by Senate Democrats. The most significant obstacle a
repeal bill would face is surely President Obama's veto power,
which would require sixty-seven senate votes to overcome. 28 7 As
such, any 2010 shift in congressional power is unlikely to result
in repeal, and the 2012 congressional and presidential races are
uncertain at this time.
If the individual mandate is invalidated by the courts, however,
a Republican Congress could prove instrumental to the downfall
of the PPACA. In other words, if the mandate requires amend-
ment to pass constitutional muster-as would be the case if found
to be an unapportioned capitation tax, for example, then a 2010
shift in congressional power could ensure elimination of the
mandate.
V. CONCLUSION
The individual mandate contained in the PPACA has provoked
enormous opposition since its introduction in House Bill 3590.
Immediately following the PPACA's passage into law, resistance
was transferred from Congress to federal courthouses across the
country. In addition, numerous state legislatures have mounted
their own challenges by passing or introducing opposition laws.
These state legislative actions, while not legally binding on Con-
gress, invite disobedience and express profound discontent.
On the judicial front, procedural doctrine and substantive
precedent remain formidable obstacles to relief. The outcomes of
the Virginia and Liberty suits, like the others, are uncertain. If
the challenges are successful, the entire PPACA is imperiled be-
cause GOP senators are not likely to support an alternate funding
mechanism, as would be necessary to sustain the increased cost of
286. See Battle for the House, supra note 285; Senate No Toss Ups, supra note 285; see
also House Outlook for 2010, 33 THE ROTHENBERG POL. REP., July 19, 2010, at 1.
287. See Jordan Fabian, McCain: GOP Hopes To Sidestep Veto in Repeal Efforts, THE
HILL (Apr. 1, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-roominews/90201-
mccain-gop-hopes-to-sidestep-veto-in-repeal-efforts (analyzing Senator McCain's alterna-
tives for overcoming Obama's veto power should the GOP win back majorities in both
houses).
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health insurance reform. In the end, while the PPACA is in place
and moving forward, its ultimate success is still in limbo. State
lawmakers and individual citizens continue to oppose what they
see as an encroachment on individual liberty and states' rights,
and these battles are likely to continue in the months and years
to come.
